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Randomised trials in context: practical
problems and social aspects of
evidence-based medicine and policy
Warren Pearce1*, Sujatha Raman1 and Andrew Turner2
Abstract
Randomised trials can provide excellent evidence of treatment benefit in medicine. Over the last 50 years,
they have been cemented in the regulatory requirements for the approval of new treatments. Randomised
trials make up a large and seemingly high-quality proportion of the medical evidence-base. However, it has
also been acknowledged that a distorted evidence-base places a severe limitation on the practice of evidence-based
medicine (EBM). We describe four important ways in which the evidence from randomised trials is limited or
partial: the problem of applying results, the problem of bias in the conduct of randomised trials, the problem
of conducting the wrong trials and the problem of conducting the right trials the wrong way. These problems are not
intrinsic to the method of randomised trials or the EBM philosophy of evidence; nevertheless, they are genuine
problems that undermine the evidence that randomised trials provide for decision-making and therefore undermine
EBM in practice. Finally, we discuss the social dimensions of these problems and how they highlight the indispensable
role of judgement when generating and using evidence for medicine. This is the paradox of randomised trial evidence:
the trials open up expert judgment to scrutiny, but this scrutiny in turn requires further expertise.
Background
Randomised trials can provide excellent evidence of
treatment benefit in medicine. In the last century they
have become cemented in the regulatory requirements
for the approval of new treatments [1, 2]. Conducting
trials and synthesising evidence from trials have them-
selves become specialised industries. Furthermore, the
method of random assignment to control versus test
group has attracted renewed attention in the world of
public and social policy where it originated in the early
20th century in psychology experiments in education [3].
Randomised trials make up a large and seemingly high-
quality proportion of the medical evidence-base.
Evidence-based medicine (EBM) is ‘the conscientious,
explicit and judicious use of current best evidence in
making decisions about the care of individual patients’
[4]. Over the last twenty years, social scientists studying
the EBM movement have stressed that because there is
no algorithmic way to practice EBM, the use of clinical
expertise to interpret and integrate research evidence
with patient values is always contingent on social and
political factors. To take two examples, much excellent
work has been conducted at the micro-level, looking at
guideline development for instance, [5–8], and at the
macro-level, looking at the politics of EBM [9–13].
One crucial point that has been increasingly ac-
knowledged, however, is the severe limitation that a
distorted evidence-base places on the practice of EBM
[14–18]. We examine this in three different contexts:
the clinical setting, regulatory decision-making on
drug approvals, and health policymaking, where deci-
sions on approved interventions (for example, for
health screening) are made drawing on evidence from
randomised trials (and that clinicians are then sup-
posed to follow). Due to limitations of space, we do
not delve into the separate question of how complex
interventions for promoting health outcomes (for ex-
ample, to reduce smoking or obesity) should be eval-
uated, that is, whether randomisation is appropriate
or even feasible in such cases.* Correspondence: warren.pearce@nottingham.ac.uk
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We proceed as follows. First, we describe four import-
ant ways in which the evidence from randomised trials is
limited or partial: the problem of applying results, the
problem of bias in the conduct of randomised trials, the
problem of conducting the wrong trials and the problem
of conducting the right trials the wrong way. These
problems are not intrinsic to the method of randomised
trials or the EBM philosophy of evidence; nevertheless
they are genuine problems that undermine the evidence
that randomised trials provide for decision-making and
therefore undermine EBM in practice. Finally, we discuss
the social dimensions of these problems and how they
highlight the indispensable role of judgement when gen-
erating and using evidence for medicine.
Review
The problem of applying results from randomised trials
The average result from a study (or more likely, the aver-
age result from many pooled studies) may not apply to a
target population. The problem of working out when re-
sults can be applied is often called the problem of external
validity [19], or the problem of extrapolation [20]. Rando-
mised trials have poor external validity because they are
designed to provide good evidence that the treatment
really is having an effect within the study population.
Philosopher of science, Nancy Cartwright, has clarified
the problem of applying randomised trial results, both in
medicine [21–23] and in policy [24]. Cartwright tells us
that from successful randomised trials we can gain good
evidence that the treatment had a positive effect on the
outcome in question in some of the study participants. If
we are worried about the external validity of randomised
trials, it is because what we want is evidence for a differ-
ent claim, namely, whether the treatment will be effect-
ive in some individuals in a target population. (We can
be more or less stringent about what effective means
here; perhaps just that the treatment helps some even
though it may harm others or that it is mostly useless in
all but a few.) According to Cartwright, this claim is not
supported by the evidence we gain from randomised tri-
als. Further evidence must be provided. The problem of
external validity therefore is not finding out what the re-
sults from randomised trials tell us about treatment ef-
fects in target populations: on their own, randomised
trials are poor evidence for that. Rather the problem is
finding the additional evidence that is needed to apply
results from randomised trials to other populations. For
example, additional evidence exists for whether this pa-
tient will likely benefit, or how a prevalent comorbidity
will affect the treatment effect.
The problem posed by external validity, especially as
formulated by Cartwright, highlights the other evidential
work that needs to be done to apply the results from
randomised trials. Depending on our knowledge about
study and target populations, however, this evidence
may be more or less straightforward to come by. First,
for example, if we have many randomised trials in
heterogeneous populations showing a consistent effect,
we have some evidence for the robustness of a treat-
ment's effect. Secondly, there are also well-known
barriers: we know to be cautious about applying results
from drug trials in adults to pediatric populations
because we know that children and neonates do not
typically behave like 'little adults' in matters of drug ab-
sorption, distribution, and metabolism.1
Cartwright claims that the other evidence that is re-
quired for applying the results of trials is often de-
emphasised or ignored. In comparison to existing tools
for assessing whether randomised trials provide good
evidence that the treatment was effective in the study
population, there are few accounts of what the other evi-
dence is or when it counts as good evidence [22]. Fur-
thermore attending to the other evidence that is needed
alongside randomised trial evidence, according to Cart-
wright, is beneficial because clarity about what is needed
focuses attention on the details and dynamics that will
affect the treatment affect in the target populations, ra-
ther than on the confused, demanding and wasteful re-
quest for 'similarity' between populations [24].
In response to Cartwright, Petticrew and Chalmers [25]
ask what assumptions are legitimate to make about the evi-
dence needed to apply results from randomised trials.
Other evidence may be needed, but as a matter of fact, it
may also be readily available. They suggest conceptualising
the problem of external validity ‘the other way round’, echo-
ing a suggestion made by Rothwell [26] that: ‘The results of
trials should be assumed to be externally valid unless there
are specific reasons to put this assumption into significant
doubt’. Either way round, expert subject knowledge is re-
quired to make judgements about external validity. In fact,
a subsequent point made by Rothwell is perhaps the most
salient, namely, that the description of trials must be suffi-
ciently detailed to permit one to judge what other evidence
is needed and where to look for it [26].
The problem of bias in the conduct of randomised trials
There have been a series of systematic reviews over the last
10 years [27–30] demonstrating that industry-funded trials
are more likely to have pro-funder results and conclusions.
Findings reported in the results section of trials are more
likely to favour the funder (their treatment is more effect-
ive or less harmful than the comparator), and the way this
gets written into the conclusions also favours the funder
(by playing up or playing down particular results).
Some examples of specific studies that have looked at
this phenomenon are herein provided. Bourgeois, Murthy
and Mandl [31] examined 546 registered trials of five dif-
ferent classes of drug, finding that 85 % of those with an
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industry sponsor had a favourable outcome; 50 % of those
with a government sponsor had a favourable outcome;
and 72 % of those with a non-profit sponsor had a
favourable outcome. Of those with a non-profit sponsor,
however, those with an industry contribution had
favourable outcomes in 85 % of cases, compared to 62 % of
those without an industry contribution. Djulbegovic et al.
[32] examined 136 trials of treatments for multiple mye-
loma, finding that in trials with a non-profit sponsor, the
new therapy was reported as better than standard treat-
ment in 53 % of cases, whereas in trials with a for-profit
sponsor, this was 74 %. Fries and Krishnan [33] looked at
45 abstracts of industry sponsored randomised trials
from the American College of Rheumatology meetings
and found that 100 % of the trials favoured the spon-
sor's drug. Many other similar studies, over the course
of 20 years, have found this asymmetry between the re-
sults of trials funded by industry and by other sources
[34, 35]. Nevertheless, it is important not to overgener-
alise the tempting narrative of industry bias, as illus-
trated by the case of statin trials [36].
Along with the observation that industry-funded trials
are more likely to have favourable results for the funder's
treatment, many of the studies and systematic reviews
above note that industry-funded trials are of equal or
higher quality than non-industry funded trials. They
rank at least as well on risk of bias measures. That is to
say, industry-funded trials are not systematically worse
at adequately blinding participants or using proper allo-
cation methods and concealment, and so on. Conse-
quently authors have outlined a range of potential
mechanisms that are not typically captured in risk-of-
bias assessment tools, by which industry interests can in-
fluence study results [37].
Such mechanisms include the strategic design, analysis
and reporting of trials [38]. To give some examples, in
the design of trials, comparators can be chosen to test a
new treatment against the current best treatment at the
wrong dose, for the wrong duration, or using something
other than the current best treatment as the comparator.
Also, outcome measures can be chosen that exaggerate
the effect. Charman et al. [39] found at least 13 'named'
scales for atopic eczema, many scales that were modified
versions of existing scales, and others that were newly
invented or unpublished (Unpublished scales are par-
ticularly dangerous, because they can be constructed
post hoc [40]). In the analysis of trial results, interests
can be promoted by finding subgroups that show a de-
sirable and significant effect. Star signs are a favourite
way to demonstrate the problem. For example, in the
ISIS-1 trial, the benefit of the intervention was four
times greater in Scorpios [41], and in the ISIS-2 trial,
Geminis and Libras did slightly worse when they got the
intervention [42]. Equally in the reporting of trial results,
interests can influence the way particular results are
emphasised or framed, notably, by choosing to use rela-
tive rather than absolute measures (20 % relative im-
provement rather than 5 % or 6 %) [43]. This influence
also works by having multiple primary outcomes, or
reporting the insignificant ones as secondary outcomes,
and even introducing significant results as new primary
outcomes [44, 45]. Furthermore, meta-analyses, just like
individual studies, suffer from these reporting biases.
Jørgensen et al. [46] looked at industry-funded and
Cochrane meta-analyses of the same drugs. None of the
Cochrane reviews recommended the drug in their con-
clusion, whereas all of the industry-funded reviews did.
In addition to these internal mechanisms affecting
design, analysis and reporting, there are also external
mechanisms for influencing the total evidence base.
The most obvious is publication bias. For example, the
multiple publication of positive studies becomes a
problem when it is 'covert' and leads to double-
counting in meta-analyses. Tramer et al. [47] examined
84 published trials of ondansetron for postoperative
emesis, which in total contained data on 20,181 pa-
tients, of which 11,980 received the treatment. They
found that 17 % of trials duplicated data, and that 28 %
of the data on the 11980 patients given ondansetron
was duplicated. Furthermore in the subgroup of 19 tri-
als that compared prophylactic ondansetron against
placebo, three of these trials were duplicated into six
further publications. Importantly, meta-analysis com-
paring the duplicated set of 25 trials against the set of
19 originals showed that duplication led to a 23 % over-
estimate of the number needed to treat.
As an alternative to covertly publishing positive studies
multiple times, a second example of publication bias is to
avoid the publication of negative studies. Melander et al.
[48] compared 42 trials of five different selective seratonin
re-uptake inhibitors submitted to the Swedish drug regu-
latory authority with 38 resulting publications. They found
much selective and multiple publication of the same data.
Of the 21 positive trials, 19 resulted in standalone publica-
tions, whereas of the 21 negative trials, only six were pub-
lished as a standalone publication. Moreover, published
pooled analyses of these trials were not comprehensive
and failed to cross-reference each other.
These mechanisms of biasing both the results of in-
dividual trials and the total evidence base provided by
trials are, of course, not an intrinsic limitation of ran-
domised trials themselves. However the fact that the
ideal randomised trial provides excellent evidence of
treatment benefit is irrelevant if the quality of many
real-world trials is compromised, thus limiting the
ability to practice EBM. As noted above, there is an
increasing momentum behind open science campaigns
(for example, alltrials.net) to address these practical
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problems, through trial registries and through greater
access to raw and unpublished data [14, 16–18].
The problem of conducting the wrong trials
Industry and other interests influence the way trials are
conducted and reported. Alongside this which trials get
conducted is also affected by industry and other inter-
ests. In particular, trials are often conducted that ask
questions that are not clinically important and waste re-
sources [49]. For example, studies have demonstrated
that the total output from randomised trials does not
track the global burden of disease [50]. While this pro-
vides some indication that research priorities do not
match global health problems, Chalmers et al. [49] note
that is not the best or only way to capture the problem.
For example, research agendas should also prioritise the
burden caused by multi-morbidities, and should be sen-
sitive to what is feasible and appropriate within a par-
ticular healthcare system.
Other studies have shown that randomised trials often
investigate commercially but not clinically important
questions. Industry interests favour potentially lucrative,
patentable, treatments while neglecting rare diseases and
treatments that are more difficult to exploit commer-
cially [51]. Every-Palmer and Howick [52] illustrate this
point by citing the lack of trials investigating exercise to
treat depression, despite some existing evidence that it is
of similar effectiveness to drug treatments. They suggest
the benefits of exercise have ‘little commercial value be-
cause exercise cannot be patented’ [52]. Equally, industry
interests do not just act to neglect less lucrative treat-
ments, but also to widen the boundaries of diagnosis
and expand existing markets, as well as turn social prob-
lems into medical conditions [51, 53].
Moreover randomised trials often investigate questions
and measure outcomes that do not matter to patients and
do not provide the evidence that clinicians need [54, 55].
In a letter to the Lancet, Liberati [56] discussed the 'avoid-
able uncertainties' that had persisted over 10 years of re-
search into multiple myeloma. He cited the fact that of
the 107 comparative phase 2 or phase 3 trials registered
with clinicaltrials.gov only 58 had survival as an outcome,
only 10 trials had it as a primary outcome, and no trials
were head-to-head comparisons. In addition to industry
interests, Liberati also blamed the general 'research gov-
ernance strategy', noting for instance that researchers
themselves often have conflicted interests and professional
dis-incentives to perform head-to-head phase-three com-
parisons, and also that there are few explicit mechanisms
for prioritising research.
More generally, issues of research prioritisation and
'agenda-setting' have been noted elsewhere [57]. Tallon
et al. [54] compared the questions addressed in studies
of treatments for osteoarthritis of the knee with the
priorities and needs of 'research consumers' (rheumatol-
ogists, general practitioners, physiotherapists and pa-
tients). They found the literature was strongly focused
on surgical and drug treatment, whereas patients and
clinicians needed information and high-quality evidence
about all treatment options. As in the examples given
above by Every-Palmer and Howick, and Liberati, Tallon
et al. suggest that this misalignment of priorities is due
to industry funding bias and researchers’ conflicts of
interest. They also list additional factors, including the
lack of consumer research involvement in an agenda-
setting. This latter issue, however, is one that has re-
ceived extensive attention in recent years [58–60]. and
many methods for involvement currently exist (for ex-
ample, the James Lind Alliance Guidebook [61]).
The problem of conducting the right trials the wrong way
Even where trials do align with clinically important
questions, significant questions can still arise over how
trials should be conducted and what constitutes meth-
odologically appropriate design in a specific context.
Typically, randomised trials are only undertaken when
genuine uncertainty exists within the expert medical
community as to the relative benefits of each interven-
tion to be tested, a state known as equipoise [62]. This
concept encapsulates a recurring dilemma faced in clin-
ical research: how the scientific imperative to obtain
more knowledge and improve the evidence base can
be reconciled with the clinicians’ therapeutic duty to
patients [63]. This dilemma was central to controver-
sies over the use of randomised trials in research into
AIDS treatment in the 1980s. Epstein [64, 65] showed
how lay activist communities were supportive of the
aims of trials seeking to develop new treatments, but
were critical of trial methodologies that they saw as
being unduly focused on generating ‘clean data’. Such
fastidiousness sat uneasily with activists who were
already incensed by drug regulation policies which
they perceived as overly paternalistic, depriving them
of the opportunity to assume the risks of trying ex-
perimental treatments [64]. Methodological demands
for participants who had not previously taken other
medication were viewed as discriminatory towards
AIDS patients who had earlier sought to treat them-
selves [64]. Tensions between ‘fastidious’ trial design,
which favoured homogeneity and the elimination of
ambiguity, and ‘pragmatic’ designs that embraced the
more messy, heterogenous aspects of clinical practice,
were not new [66]. What they illustrate is that it may
not always be possible, or desirable, to implement
randomised trials on the basis of internal scientific
validity alone. In the AIDS case, activists did win
concessions in trial design around a more pragmatic
approach to participation [64].
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The AIDS trials case illustrates the enduring problem
of the equipoise dilemma, in that judgements about the
balance between scientific and therapeutic imperatives
are necessarily imperfect and uncertain, particularly
when such judgements become opened up to patient
pressure. What can rightly be seen as methodological
distortion when industry unduly biases the conduct and
reporting of trials necessarily appears different when
duty-of-care is at stake in cases where patients try to
exert influence. This is not to say that the knowledge
gained from randomised trials in such circumstances is
necessarily less useful, but rather that randomised trials
can be subject to significant, often inescapable, social pres-
sures and professional dilemmas, which provide important
contexts for their assessment as clinical evidence.
Discussion – the social aspects of randomised trials
The limitations outlined above have implications for the
development of advice and recommendations, for ex-
ample, in the form of officially sanctioned guidelines such
as those provided by the National Institute for Health and
Care Excellence for treatments, screening programmes
and other policy decisions. The efficacy of screening
programmes (for example, for breast cancer) has been
particularly controversial in recent years, with some ex-
perts arguing that the risks of over diagnosis in mam-
mography are poorly understood and calling for an
independent review of the evidence on benefits and harms
of mammography (see exchange between Bewley [67] and
Richards [68]). In this context, the UK National Screening
Committee’s criteria highlight a need for evidence from
high quality randomised trials that screening is effective in
reducing mortality and morbidity. The largest-ever rando-
mised controlled trial on outcomes from extension of
mammographic screening from 50-70 years to 47-73 years
is also underway [68].
Yet, such evidence will need to be put in the context
of broader social and value-based questions on how we
collectively engage with uncertain evidence, balance pre-
caution and risk, and the distribution of rights and re-
sponsibilities that follow from new forms of knowledge.
Sociologists have identified concerns about screening as
a form of ‘surveillance’ and creation of new burdens on
individuals (who are not ‘patients’) to conform to public
health programmes, sensitivities in the process of gain-
ing informed consent, and challenges people face in
dealing with the necessarily uncertain knowledge pro-
duced by screening technologies [69, 70]. Equally, where
access to screening is seen as an important benefit for
health, similar questions to those raised in the AIDS
case may arise when extension of breast cancer screen-
ing beyond the 50-70 years bracket is subject to random-
isation. Healthcare professionals must also balance
ambivalent evidence, delivery of care and cost pressures.
Randomised trials cannot resolve these questions. Repre-
senting trials as a central part of EBM is, therefore,
problematic as it strips away the more challenging as-
pects of the screening controversy. Indeed, the Screening
Committee implicitly acknowledges this by adding a cri-
terion that screening tests must be ‘clinically, socially and
ethically acceptable to health professionals and the public’
(https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/evidence-
reviewcriteria-national-screening-programmes/criteria-
for-appraising-the-viability-effectiveness-andappropriateness-
of-a-screening-programme). Qualitative research on dif-
ferent judgments that people make can inform this dis-
cussion on acceptability and also, desirability of specific
interventions. The danger, though, is that trial evidence
may crowd out such evidence by promising an impos-
sible certainty of either a ‘positive’ (screening is effective)
or ‘negative’ (there is no evidence that screening is ef-
fective) kind.
Historically, some commentators have highlighted the
dangers of randomised trials unduly crowding out other
forms of evidence in clinical settings [71]. However, the
notion of ‘hierarchies’ of evidence within evidence-based
medicine is no longer prevalent in the literature, being
replaced by more nuanced typologies of evidence dem-
onstrating how different research methods are appropri-
ate for answering different types of research question
[72, 73]. For example, Petticrew and Roberts [74] argue
that randomised trials are most suited to questions of
effectiveness, safety and cost effectiveness, but unsuited
to addressing issues of salience, appropriateness, service
delivery and service satisfaction. For these questions,
qualitative research is found to be more appropriate.
These social dimensions are critical; as Petticrew and
Roberts point out, we have known for over 150 years
that handwashing reduces infection, yet our knowledge
of how to encourage increased handwashing remains
poor. However, as we have shown above, the social di-
mensions of clinical practice are not confined to post-
trial implementation of recommendations. The assump-
tions made within randomised trials themselves require
interrogation. These may not just be limited to the di-
lemma of scientific and therapeutic concerns highlighted
in the case of AIDS patient activism; they also stretch
to issues of interpretation. As one psycho-oncologist
commented regarding the independent review of breast
screening:
‘The mantra that 'finding things early' is essentially a
good thing is so inculcated into our collective psyche
that even-handed appraisal of the data and rational
decision-making is virtually impossible. I've worked
within the field of breast cancer research for more than
27 years, have read all the opinions of epidemiologists
and others, and scrutinised the latest publications, but
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even I remain uncertain about the value of screening
mammography. I feel simultaneously silly for attending
but scared not to do so’ [75].
Such self-reflection from experienced practitioners on
the inbuilt assumptions within evidence architectures
are vital, yet remain qualitative in nature and beyond the
scope of quantitative analysis of randomised trials.
Conclusions
In the end, randomised trials cannot substitute for ex-
pertise as is sometimes argued. Instead, the credibility of
trial evidence can be enhanced by paying attention to
the kinds of expertise required to make such evidence
matter and by combining statistical knowledge with per-
sonal, experiential knowledge [76]. Evidence requires in-
terpretation and never ‘speaks for itself ’. That is, experts
providing advice need to acknowledge different mean-
ings and consider a plurality of sources and forms of
evidence [77], and institutions play a key role in main-
taining transparency and standards in both the produc-
tion of evidence and its mediation by expert advisors
[78]. These nuances risk being overlooked within a culture
of standardisation that risks focusing on bureaucratic rules
at the expense of patient-centred care [79, 80].
What Miller [81] describes as a ‘culture of reasoning’
within institutions, mediating different forms of evidence
for decision-making purposes, will be important for the
social value of randomised trials. To be sure, randomised
trials can offer a counter-weight to unwarranted cer-
tainty or decision-making that rests on a narrow set of
assumptions drawn from previous experience or per-
sonal bias. But judgments must still be made about the
nature of the question a trial is meant to address (could
it be asking the ‘wrong’ question?) and about the role of
potential bias in interpreting the evidence generated
(what assumptions have been made and could they be
contested?). This is the paradox of randomised trial evi-
dence: it opens up expert judgment to scrutiny, but this
scrutiny in turn requires further expertise.
Endnote
1Thanks to Rachel Johnson for this example.
Abbreviation
EBM: evidence-based medicine.
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